Chloroquine resistance was first detected in Kenya in 1978 and escalated during the 1980s. Chloroquine remained the treatment of choice for uncomplicated malaria infections until revised guidelines were launched in 1998 despite a plethora of scientific evidence on failure. This review analyses the range and quality of the evidence base that was used to change the drug policy in Kenya from chloroquine to SP and examines the process of consensus building and decision making. Our review illustrates the difficulties in translating sensitivity data with gross geographical, temporal and methodological variations into national treatment policy. The process was complicated by limited options, unknown adverse effects of replacement therapies, cost, as well as limited guidance on factors pertinent to changing the drug policy for malaria. Although Ͼ 50% of the studies showed parasitological failures by 1995, there was a general lack of consensus on the principles for assessing drug failures, the inclusion criteria for the study subjects and the relative benefits of parasitological and clinical assessments. A change in international recommendations for assessment of drug efficacy in 1996 from parasitological to clinical response further perplexed the decisions. There is an urgent need for international standards and evidence-based guidelines to provide a framework to assist the process by which decision-makers in malaria-endemic countries can make rational choices for antimalarial drug policy change.
Introduction
The intensifying resistance of Plasmodium falciparum to affordable first-and second-line antimalarial therapies in Africa presents new challenges for national drug policies in the region. Chloroquine has been the mainstay treatment for uncomplicated P. falciparum infections in East Africa since its introduction during the 1930s. Confirmed cases of chloroquine-resistant infections were first reported in nonimmune tourists to Kenya and Tanzania in 1978 (Fogh et al. 1979; Faelmann et al. 1981; Pettersson et al. 1981) and in semi-immune Kenyans in 1982 (Spencer et al. 1982) . Thereafter, levels of resistance in Kenya escalated with the first case of resistance at the RIII level reported in a Kenyan infant in 1985 (Oloo et al. 1986) . Not until 1998 was chloroquine officially replaced as the first-line therapy with a combination of sulphadoxine and pyrimethamine (SP) .
Decisions about appropriate therapies are based largely on efficacy data from in vivo studies that aim to quantify levels of resistance among locally acquired parasite populations. A range of models have been proposed to assist policy revision using data derived from efficacy studies and based upon a variety of assumptions including expert opinion of changing disease burden, costs and compliance (Sudre et al. 1992; Schapira et al. 1993; Bloland & Ettling 1998; Goodman et al. 1999 ). These models have provided important academic contributions to our understanding of risks and costs per death averted. However, they do not capture the complex matrix of decision making on the pros and cons associated with limited choices, unknown risks of side-effects, affordability of new drugs to consumers or government and the ever evasive problem of assessing how long revised choices of drugs will remain efficacious. This paper reviews the empirical evidence on chloroquine resistance in Kenya between 1979 and . It emphasizes the complexity of the decision-making process by highlighting TMIH643 the methodological, geographical and temporal variation within these national data. The empirical evidence is discussed against the sequential decisions made by the Government of Kenya's Ministry of Health (MoH) and its partners to the point when the MoH ultimately decided to abandon chloroquine in favour of SP.
Materials and methods

Data collection
Published in vivo chloroquine resistance studies carried out in Kenya between 1979 and 1998 were identified through searches of on-line databases (Medline ® and Popline ® ). These publications were cross-referenced to identify further, non-digital published sources. Unpublished MoH reports, national and regional conference proceedings and local postgraduate theses were also reviewed to locate further survey data. Correspondence with authors of the publications allowed clarification of several parameters not presented in the reports and possible duplication of reports between the grey and published literature. In vitro or molecular studies were not included in the review as these have rarely influenced policy decisions in Africa. Such studies may, however, increase in value as more appropriate molecular markers of drug failure become available in the future.
Data were transcribed onto structured proformas. Information included dates of surveys, study location, dosage of chloroquine, age range of subjects, sample size, type of sensitivity test used, and the results of post-treatment failures. All data were double entered using Access ® (Microsoft ® Access version 7.0, Seattle, USA 1997) and verified to identify data entry errors. Corrected data were subjected to a series of range checks to identify inconsistencies, which were re-checked against original reports or correspondence with authors.
1
Geographical classification
The longitude/latitude of the study site was recorded using a combination of 1 : 50 000-scale topographical maps or digital gazetteers and plotted using a GIS platform (Mapinfo ® Professional, version 4.0; MapInfo Corporation, Troy, NY, USA 1995). The geo-position of each survey was used to identify the district boundary in which the study was located. Kenya's 68 district boundaries cover a diverse range of climatic and ecological conditions which themselves support the entire spectrum of malaria transmission. Districts have been crudely classified according to epidemiological patterns of parasite transmission, which in turn support different population disease risks (Table 1) Hay et al. 1998; Snow et al. 1998 ).
Treatment failure definitions
Where possible, sensitivity data from the reports were restructured according to criteria shown in Table 2 . These included parasitological failures on days 7 (Prasad et al. 1990), 14 and 28 (Bruce-Chwatt et al. 1986 ), or RI, RII, RIII resistance (WHO 1973 ), or clinical failures (WHO 1996 measured by acceptable clinical rate (ACR), early treatment failure (ETF) and late treatment failure (LTF) ( Table 2 ). The purpose was to allow spatial and temporal comparisons of studies employing similar methods of classification.
Criteria for abandoning current first-line antimalarial drugs have been explored by Schapira et al. (1993) using a mathematical model comparing long-and short-term consequences of earlier versus later changes in drug policy to minimize costs due to mortality and the economic implications of more expensive replacements. The authors propose that considerations of changing first-line therapies for malaria should begin at levels of 15% parasitological failures at the RI/RII level or by days 7 or 14. They suggest that parasitological failures above 25% by days 7 or 14 be used as the criteria for a change in first-line therapeutics. Sudre et al. (1992) used a decision tree analysis to investigate the cost-effectiveness of alternative weighted decisions from a Delphi survey of assumed case fatality rates, costeffectiveness and compliance against therapeutic failure. The authors concluded that a change in first-line therapy was justified when the prevalence of RIII resistance to chloroquine was in the range 14-31%. However, these analyses are no longer valid as they are based on assumptions regarding a cost differential between chloroquine and SP of 40%. RIII 'failures' were classified as failures Ͼ 14% representing the lower end of the range proposed by Sudre et al. (1992) considering that the price differential between SP and chloroquine was substantially narrower by 1998. In concert with this range, Bloland et al. (1993) concluded that RIII parasitological responses in Kenya strongly predicted poor haematological response and that when the level of RIII parasitological responses exceeded 5-10%, a careful evaluation of the clinical response should be undertaken. They suggest that a 25% clinical failure rate within 14 days after therapy or an RIII parasitological failure requiring a change in treatment before day 3 be regarded as an unacceptable level of failure, warranting a change in policy. We did not consider RI/RII responses due to the lack of uniformity in the presentation of these data. Using these varied criteria (Table 2) , in vivo sensitivity data for Kenya were re-classified and cumulatively plotted to show 'failure' or 'success' across the period 1979-98 and in accordance with their geographical representation.
Review of scientific and Ministry of Health decisions
Official MoH documentation including reports, minutes of meetings and newspaper statements were reviewed to identify decisions made and positions taken by the various MoH, research, donor and other stakeholders. These 'milestones' are used in the discussion to highlight difficulties in the interpretation of the temporal and geographical evidence generated from the efficacy studies.
Results
The data
The data search identified 59 temporally and geographically independent in vivo studies of chloroquine resistance undertaken between 1979 and 1998. Two studies conducted in Busia (Owaga et al. 1980; Masaba & Spencer 1982) (Sudre et al. 1992 ) ACR Parasite count is Ͻ 25% of the count on day 0 with no parasitaemia on day 7, but there is no history of fever over 24 h ETF Parasitaemia on day 3 Ն 25% of the count on day 0 or development of complicated malaria in the first 3 days or a history of fever. LTF.
did not
Parasitaemia on day 3 is Ͻ 25% of the count on day 0 25% combined ETF ϩ lTF and parasites are present on day 7, with a history of fever (Bloland et al. 1993; WHO 2000) over the previous 24 h or the development of complicated malaria on days 4-7 Tropical Medicine and International Health volume 5 no 11 pp 755-764 november 2000
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use the standard dosage of 25 mg/kg and these were excluded from subsequent review. The remaining 57 studies were conducted in 24 districts across the country. Of these, 15 (26%) studies were conducted among the coastal population, 27 (47%) in districts located around Lake Victoria, seven (12%) in the highlands and eight (14%) in low, stable transmission or arid areas of the country.
Forty-nine (86%) of the in vivo sensitivity studies were conducted among populations under 18 years of age. In addition three (5%) were undertaken among pregnant women, two (3.5%) among nonpregnant adults and six (10.5%) included all ages. Of the combined studies more than half were comprised clinical cases detected at outpatient departments (51%). One study examined severe clinical cases managed as inpatients. Of the remaining studies 16 (28%) were undertaken amongst asymptomatic schoolchildren and nine (16%) used parasitaemic individuals detected during community screening.
We have selected and abstracted the studies using populations Ͻ 18 years for formal analysis as these represent the majority of studies and there are difficulties in comparative analysis with studies of pregnant women or those of all ages. Of this reduced dataset, 21 (43%) of the studies were conducted in hospital outpatients, 16 (28%) in asymptomatic schoolchildren, one among hospital inpatients and the remainder used community studies to detect parasitaemic individuals (18%).
The reports suggest that varied criteria for chloroquine sensitivity were used and several studies used more than one criterion to evaluate drug resistance. Thirty-seven studies used day 7 parasitological failure, 14 used the WHO extended in vivo day 14 failures, while 20 measured RI, RII and RIII parasitological failures. The five studies carried out after 1996 included clinical failures in keeping with the revised international standards for measuring drug efficacy (WHO 1996) . 
Geographical and temporal distribution of resistance evidence
The 49 studies among the populations Ͻ 18 years of age were used to define the various definitions of drug failure between 1979 and 1988, 1989-94 and 1995-98 according to the ecological zones of Kenya (Table 1 ). Figure 1a -d demonstrates the cumulative evidence across the country of chloroquine failures according to day 7, day 14 or RIII parasitological failures or ETF ϩ LTF, respectively.
Several points emerge from Table 3 and Fig. 1a -d: firstly, the relative paucity of data among populations located in the highland epidemic areas of Kenya and the arid areas of the country; 22% of all studies since 1979. 42% of all studies were conducted in the Lake Victoria region. Secondly, by 1990, 11/32 (34%) of all studies undertaken since 1979 had demonstrated that 25% of the children recruited for study were unable to clear infections by day 7. Six of 10 (60%) studies showed that 25% of the study populations were unable to clear infections by day 14 and 5/17 (29%) studies reported Ͼ 14% of subjects with RIII resistant infections. Between April 1987 and October 1997, eight studies which employed the revised WHO definitions of clinical failure were undertaken, seven indicated unacceptable levels of failure (Ͼ 25%).
Discussion
Changing the policy
The issue of chloroquine resistance was acknowledged at a meeting organized by the Kenya Medical Research Institute in January 1989 (Anonymous 1989) . At this point there had been eight descriptions of parasitological failure (in excess of 25% of children unable to clear infection by day 7) recorded in studies across the country (Figure 1a) . Nevertheless, it was also recognized that chloroquine still relieved the symptoms of uncomplicated malaria, it was safe and inexpensive and it was thus agreed at this meeting that it should be retained as the first-line therapy for the treatment of uncomplicated malaria. By 1991, 11 studies had recorded parasitological failures by day 7 (Figure 1a) , six studies had recorded failures by day 14 (Figure 1b) and five had recorded levels of RIII resistance in excess of 14% (Figure 1c) . At this juncture the MoH recognized the more urgent need for revised guidelines for the management of uncomplicated malaria and Anabwani et al. (1996) established a technical committee in 1991. Between 1991 and 1995 there were few new studies of chloroquine sensitivity and it is hard to precisely gauge what policy action was undertaken during this period, although several further technical committee meetings were convened. At a meeting of the technical committee in July 1995 (MoH 1995a), it was established that new national clinical guidelines could not be produced without first resolving the issue of chloroquine resistance. This meeting highlighted a general lack of consensus on the frequency of therapeutic failures to chloroquine across Kenya. What continued to prevail was constant reference to a few studies from selected sites in Siaya and Kilifi Districts, located in the Lake and Coastal regions, respectively. A national compendium of research data, such as the summary presented in this paper, was not available and several members of this committee meeting were asked to provide a digest of the evidence todate.
Appropriate decisions can only be made in the presence of comparative data on other feasible options. Our review revealed that by 1995 over 50% of studies had defined chloroquine failure according to the day 7, day 14, RI/RII or RIII definitions. This compared with a failure of 20% (2/10) of efficacy studies on amodiaquine by day 7, 22% (2/9) by day 14 and none demonstrating failure at the RIII level. Using the same criteria, none of the studies conducted on SP (10 studies using the day 7 and day 14 parasitological failure and six studies using RI/RII/RIII parasitological and clinical failure) showed failure as defined by our previous criteria of assessment (data not shown).
In July 1995 there continued to be some reluctance on the part of other members of the MoH to change the policy, as alternatives to chloroquine were considered to have higher incidences of side-effects and were at the time more expensive. These claims were made in the absence of any national or international, meta-analysis of side-effects of either amodiaquine or SP, but represented potent enough anecdotal responses to increase prevarication over appropriate choices. Perhaps also significant at the time were allegations that the WHO had been very critical of Malawi regarding their recent change of first-line therapy to SP and a view expressed by some that the pharmaceutical companies may have vested interests in the change to SP.
In August 1995 District Medical Officers of Health from 13 epidemic-prone districts reported their dissatisfaction with chloroquine as an effective therapy at a meeting organized by UNICEF to train the District Health Management Team on epidemic preparedness. Nearly 80% reported that their treatment regimen consisted of chloroquine followed by SP. The MoH recognized that far less was known about chloroquine sensitivity amongst these populations (Table 3) and that anecdotal claims required further substantiation.
In November 1995 a summary of the available studies on parasitological failure following chloroquine treatment was re-presented to the technical committee (MoH 1995b) . The data presented were summarized as parasitological failures by day 7 of 56% in Western Kenya, 72% at the Coast and 61% in non-endemic areas. This represented a significant shift in the technical committee's consensus position in support of a policy change. On the basis of these results, the technical committee recommended to the MoH that SP replace chloroquine, as it had a simple single dose regimen and by now a relatively low cost in comparison to other alternatives.
The technical committee continued to be dominated by members of the research community and much animated discussion prevailed at this time over the appropriateness of markers of efficacy, both nationally and internationally. The concern toward the end of 1995 was that evidence based upon parasitological clearance alone was not consistent with the growing trend toward measuring drug efficacy through clinical outcomes. Several scientists working in Kenya had already provided much needed evidence on the relationships between RIII levels of resistance and haematological impacts . In addition during 1995 unpublished evidence was provided from Siaya District Hospital following a 1-month surveillance of patients treated with chloroquine who experienced a mortality rate of 20% compared to 4% of those treated with SP.
In 1995 there was clearly a lack of agreement on what data was most relevant to provide an appropriate evidence base. There are differing perceptions regarding the type of study population and the inclusion criteria that should be used in efficacy studies. The data by 1995 represented a mix of study groups including 27% of the studies among asymptomatic school populations. suggest that efficacy studies should be carried out in groups believed to be at the highest risk of death such as sick children less than 5 years of age. After 1995 increasingly studies were located among symptomatic patients recruited at outpatient departments. However, given that (a) fever management often involves polypharmacy and (b) the majority of fevers are managed first at home with drugs purchased over-the-counter (often including chloroquine-based proprietary forms), many of the patients recruited into sensitivity studies at clinics were possibly self-defined treatment failures. Studies measuring parasitological failures on days 14 and 28 provide more information than those measuring day 7 failures; but they are more expensive to carry out and have the potential to be less precise due to difficulties in follow-up . Furthermore, distinguishing between re-infection and recrudescence beyond 14 days becomes increasingly complex, thus making the dichotomy between RI and sensitive infections more difficult. Perhaps of greater significance were the often small sample sizes used during the studies of chloroquine sensitivity in Kenya before 1995: 47% (20/43) of studies were based upon sample sizes of less than 40 subjects. The most appropriate markers of resistance and the optimal recruitment strategies continue to fuel disagreements over efficacy study findings.
Influential in this dialogue was the African Regional Office of the WHO (AFRO) which had been developing new sensitivity testing guidelines (WHO 1996) . The MoH were persuaded by AFRO to request a consultant to carry out sensitivity studies based on the new protocol and to train the national team in these methods. The first of a series of studies was conducted in January 1996 in Kisumu and results showed that 85% of children under 5 years failed chloroquine treatment. Against this background of new efficacy data, donors mounted a concerted effort to lobby the MoH regarding their concern over the speed with which antimalarial drug policy was being revised. In response to pressure from several bilateral donors at a partners meeting in March 1996, the Ministry of Health agreed to change the first-line therapy, but only in areas of holoendemic transmission (MoH 1999) . This decision was supported by AFRO.
Subsequent clinical failure studies were collectively presented at a meeting convened by the WHO country office and the Malaria Control Programme to endorse the transition from chloroquine to SP in March 1997. Despite 50 independent studies of chloroquine sensitivity up to the presentation of these eight clinical efficacy studies (based upon samples between 27 and 56 patients), it was these latter studies which probably represented the final turning point for a consensus agreement between the scientific and control communities around the move from chloroquine to SP.
In 1997 several meetings considered the implications of selected introduction of revised guidelines versus national implementation (see below). In October 1997 draft guidelines were issued. This represented a period of 6 years after a call by the MoH to review the scientific evidence in support of a revision. These guidelines were officially launched in August 1998 after a round of consultation with various technical committee members and AFRO. By the time of the launch of the revised national guidelines, more than 20 independent studies, spanning 14 years, across the country had recorded chloroquine failure (Tables 2 and 3) .
Implementing policy change
After the March 1997 recommendation that SP replace chloroquine only in areas of holoendemic malaria, a second committee was formed in September 1997 to consider the implications of implementing this policy. This new committee had a wider representation from the implementers and research institutions, the Essential Drugs Programme and the National Quality Control Laboratory. Deliberations by this committee recognized the difficulties of implementing subnational policies within a national essential drugs framework which is based upon a 'push' rather than 'pull' system. Furthermore, the over-arching Kenyan drug policy framework did not allow regional policies. The consensus view was that national implementation would be the easiest option. However between June and September 1996 a study was undertaken in Turkana, an area of low seasonal transmission, which found a failure rate of only 7% for chloroquine among patients aged 1-40 years (Clarke et al. 1996) . These results proved to be influential in the way the new national guidelines were ultimately phrased. It was decided in October 1997 that the policy change from chloroquine to SP would be a national recommendation, with the caveat that SP would be the treatment of choice in 'areas where malaria is chloroquine resistant' but chloroquine would continue to be recommended in 'areas where malaria is chloroquine sensitive ' (MoH 1998) . This left some ambiguity about which drug should be employed given the limited coverage of existing sensitivity data, the dynamic nature of changing sensitivity and poor access by practitioners to empirical data.
Despite the new composition, the technical committee formed to oversee implementation had little dialogue with other significant committees within the MoH. These parallel groups included the Executive Board, the Pharmacies and Poisons Board and the committee comprising Provincial Medical Officers of Health (PMOs) who oversaw revisions to essential drugs. No representation during the dialogue to change policy was solicited from the providers of proprietary forms of antimalarial drugs in Kenya to the informal sector. The consequence of omitting these groups from the dialogue led to further delays in both effective formulation of a revised recommendation and implementation of this revision when it was made in October 1997.
First, many PMOs had not been briefed about the emerging data and their public health significance. Several PMOs maintained, even in 1997, that chloroquine was still an effective antimalarial and they would continue to use the drug. The fault probably lies with ineffective mechanisms of communicating research evidence to those directly involved in wider health sector policy development and implementation. The lack of awareness of the PMOs almost certainly contributed to delays in the official launch of the National Guidelines and the revisions of the essential drugs kits.
Secondly, in order to be fully effective, SP had to be available to the lowest levels of the formal health sector. By March 1998, SP was a prescription only medication (POM) and could therefore only be dispensed by qualified clinical and pharmacy staff. This did not include community-health workers or dispensers at the periphery of the health system. In March 1998, the Medical Supplies Co-ordinating Unit (MSCU) approached the department responsible for essential drug policies to discuss how changes in the essential drug kits could be re-designed to support every level of the health service. Communication from the Malaria Control Unit to the Chief Pharmacist to deregulate the POM status was made late in 1998 and the necessary Government Gazetting occurred in October 1999.
Finally, following effective changes to the legislation SP could be made available by recognized medical and paramedical staff without prescription after October 1999. However, there remained one very significant sector that had not yet been addressed: the informal, shop level of drug distribution. In Kenya these outlets are the major source of antimalarial drugs to the community (Mwenesi 1994) and there was a growing concern that very limited amounts of SP could be found at shops compared to the now POMregulated chloroquine. Consultation with the manufacturers and suppliers of drugs to the informal sector revealed that SP remained a Part II (Schedule IV) poison (Government of Kenya 1988) making it illegal for manufacturers to actively distribute to unlicensed premises. At the time of writing these problems remain and there is little national access to informal sector SP.
Conclusions
The process of changing a drug that had been a cornerstone drug for clinical practice in Kenya for over 50 years was clearly complex and protracted. The 20 years following the detection of the first chloroquine-resistant infection in Kenya to a semi-effective implementation of a revised recommended first-line drug was characterized by several key features. Firstly, the confusion that surrounded what constitutes 'failure' was instrumental in delays in moving from chloroquine to SP. Despite recent associations between the emergence of chloroquine resistance and increasing malariaspecific mortality in Senegal (Trape et al. 1998) there remains a paucity of good epidemiological data on the public health consequences of the 'failure' of a drug to eliminate infection and the retention of some mild clinical signs within 14 days. Furthermore, areas where the primary sources of treatment are not those used to recruit patients for drug sensitivity, may over-represent drug failures in a given population.
Secondly, it was not clear just how much evidence is required to change existing national recommendations. Should a single study from one area, which demonstrates high levels of failure, dictate a change? If multiple studies, across several administration or ecological settings, provide the evidence platform for change, how many studies demonstrating failure warrant a decision to effect a change in policy? Should the location or number of studies showing failure be related to the numbers of people at risk or the expected number of disease events? At several points in the Kenyan decision-making process, reference was made to whether what was described around Lake Victoria was indeed the case elsewhere. Conversely a single study showing chloroquine sensitivity led to an ambiguous national recommendation for SP use only where there was resistance to chloroquine. This latter study was conducted in an arid area of Kenya reflecting the ecological zones with only 16% of the total population of Kenya (Table 1) .
Thirdly, drug choices are always hard to make without a substantiated series of cost-benefit analyses of adverse effects. Likewise it is often hard to estimate the true costs of new drugs to end-users and Governments. This paucity of empirical data for national governments has impacted upon the rational decision-making processes during the 1990s in Kenya of choosing alternatives to chloroquine. Some may argue that we require better evidence and guidance on the epidemiological and public health implications of drug sensitivity data supplemented with a more cogent series of guidelines on side-effects and costs to provide a rational basis for changing first-line drugs in Africa. We believe that the Kenyan process described in this paper would have almost certainly been quicker if there were internationally agreed rubrics to follow.
Finally, our review has highlighted two further considerations of perhaps greater importance. Developing consensus agreement around evidence is paramount and this often requires stakeholders not intuitively obvious to the process. In addition, getting policy into practice is by no means easy. It involves many parts of the health sector and represents an iterative process that should begin well before launching a policy revision. We do not believe that the experiences described in this paper are uniquely Kenyan. Many African countries, in particular Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique, are facing similar challenges. There is a need to share experience and reflect upon the commonly encountered barriers to effective decision making and implementation.
